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am a junior majoring in International Studies and 
German with a minor in Music Performance.  I 
am a Singletary Scholar, a Chellgren Fellow, and a 
Gaines Fellow, as well as a student Vice President 
of the recently inaugurated UK chapter of Phi Kappa 
Phi.  I serve as an executive board member for SPUR, 
the Society for the Promotion of Undergraduate Research. 
Before writing this paper on capital punishment and 
women, I conducted research on the death penalty 
and international norms, which I presented at the 
Showcase of Undergraduate Scholars at UK, Posters-at-the-Capitol in 
Frankfort, the Southern Regional Honors Conference in St. Petersburg, 
Florida, and at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research in La 
Crosse, Wisconsin.  After graduating in 2010, I hope to attend law school, 
one reason for my interest in the death penalty.  The following paper was 
written for Prof. Srimati Basu’s GWS 600 course on law and women.  I 
am particularly grateful to Prof. Basu for introducing me to women’s 
issues and providing constant support throughout the class and the paper.
A U T H O R Jenna Brashear
I
Faculty Mentor: Professor Srimati Basu
Department of Gender and Women’s Studies
Jenna Brashear’s paper “Gender and Capital Punishment: The Case of Gaile 
Owens” carries my highest recommendation for consideration to be published 
in Kaleidoscope.  The paper raises provocative questions for jurisprudence 
and feminist theory; draws substantively on research in Political Science, 
Women’s Studies, and Law; and includes original, close analysis of a legal 
case.  As a paper that is strong on research as well as argument, structure, 
and analysis, it is an excellent candidate for inclusion in an undergraduate 
research journal.  Jenna wrote this paper as the one undergraduate student 
in a graduate seminar focused on feminist jurisprudence, heavy on legal 
and cultural theory, and was among the most keen analytical and diligent 
readers in the class.  The paper reflects her depth of understanding in these 
issues and her attempt to leave her own mark within this body of work, and 
thus also exemplifies undergraduate academic engagement and excellence.
Gender and Capital 
Punishment: The 
Case of Gaile Owens
Abstract:
The United States’ use of capital punishment is a 
practice oft-debated in many disciplines, but the 
gender imbalance of the death penalty in favor 
of women makes feminists one group hesitant to 
discuss the practice.  Although females account for 
one in ten murder arrests, they are only one percent 
of the criminals actually executed.  This paper 
examines the implications of capital punishment for 
women, and attempts to explain why women are 
executed at a disproportionately low rate.  Trends 
that emerge include institutional structures, such 
as aggravating or mitigating factors, which are 
constructed in a manner that dictates the severest 
punishments for male crimes.  Additionally, social 
ideologies and stereotypes are often reinforced 
during trials and sentencing, when judges and 
juries tell us directly and implicitly that women are 
simply too good, fair, and delicate to commit such 
heinous crimes.  All of these elements contribute 
to the low rates of capital sentences and executions 
for female criminals.  This paper includes analysis 
of feminist thought on capital punishment and the 
state, namely the works of Elizabeth Rapaport, 
Renee Heberle, Wendy Brown, and Wendy 
Williams.  Finally, these theories are applied to 
the case of Owens v. Guida, which illustrates 
how far a woman must reach outside of societal 
norms to be sentenced to death and executed. 
Introduction:
In traditional feminist discourse, common issues 
include marriage, reproduction and pregnancy, 
equality in the workplace, and the position of 
such social institutions with regard to masculine 
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systems of law.  For the great majority of these 
instances, the women studied are disadvantaged — 
held in limiting roles such as housewives, underpaid 
in comparison to their male counterparts, and 
discriminated against either directly or subtly by policies 
created for the societal “norm,” who is most often a man. 
There are, however, a few rare instances in which 
women can be seen as benefitting from the stereotypical 
traits from which they often attempt to break free.  The 
classic example of this is the military draft, a process 
that defies gender equality.  What is the state saying 
when drafting men to war and leaving women at home? 
It would be hard to argue that traditional gender roles 
were not reinforced by the draft.  Another lesser-known 
practice that is gender imbalanced is that of capital 
punishment, and the practice brings many of the same 
questions to the surface.  What does it say about law 
and culture in the United States that we execute men at a 
much higher rate than women?  The statistical disparities 
in capital punishment between men and women and the 
issues of state and societal complicity with the imbalance 
are not often placed within the feminist framework 
and, therefore, that is what I will attempt to do.
Although capital punishment is not illegal, 
meaning it does not exclude women totally as the 
draft does, courts in the United States are much less 
willing to sentence women to death and, through 
the appellate and death row processes, women are 
disproportionately removed from the figurative guillotine 
as compared to men.  Victor Streib provides the following 
statistics in his report “The Death Penalty for Female 
Offenders, January 1, 1973 Through December 31, 
2007:” though one in ten murder arrests are women, 
they comprise only one in 50 capital sentences, only 
one in 67 death row prisoners, and only 1 in 100 of 
those “actually executed in the modern era” (2008, p. 3).
In the following essay, I will examine the use of 
the death penalty for women in the United States in a 
general context as well as from a feminist viewpoint.  I 
will examine gender discrepancies in greater depth and 
attempt to explain why the state does not wish to execute 
women in the United States.  In addition to attempting 
to make sense of alarming statistics, I have chosen a 
2008 case to analyze involving capital punishment for 
a woman, Owens v. Guida.  The language the three 
judges choose to articulate their opinions in this case 
is just as relevant as the statistics.  With this paper I 
hope to extend common feminist issues and questions, 
such as how women’s social identities carry over into 
the legal realm.  Are women simply viewed to be too 
delicate to be put in the electric chair or injected with 
the lethal three-drug cocktail?  Do we believe them 
incapable of acts of such violence and aggression? 
These are the types of questions I will try to answer.
J e n n a  B r a s h e a rG e n d e r  a n d  c a P i t a l  P u n i s h m e n t :  t h e  c a s e  o f  G a i l e  o We n s
Why Capital Punishment 
Is Structured in Favor of Women: 
The Work of Victor Streib
Not only does capital punishment for women lie outside 
of the usual feminist discussions, it is also something 
of an anomaly within mainstream death penalty 
discourse.  One of the strongest arguments against capital 
punishment as a whole is the effectual discrimination 
that occurs.  Only 57% of those executed since 1976 
have been white, while 34% were black and 7% were 
Hispanic (Death Penalty Information Center Race, 
2009).  Moreover, black men who allegedly killed white 
victims comprise 235 of the executions in the same time 
period, although only 15 white defendants with black 
victims were executed.  Within the population of women 
executed, the racial element is basically erased.  Of the 11 
women executed since 1976, only two have been black 
(DPIC Women, 2009).  The remaining nine were white.
Perhaps somewhat due to the attention given 
to race, gender and capital punishment is almost 
ignored.  Writings on the subject are largely legal, 
statistical, or anecdotal.  There are essays on whether 
or not women’s support for the death penalty is 
different from men’s (Durham, et al., 1996; and 
Whitehead, et al., 2000); analyses of how men and 
women are victimized differently (Gartner, et al., 
1990); and stories of executed women (Gillespie, 
2000).  There are statistical analyses such as O’Shea’s 
Women and the Death Penalty in the United States, 
1900-1998 (1999), and regional accounts such as 
Streib’s The Fairer Death: Executing Women in Ohio 
(2006) and Reza’s “Gender Bias in North Carolina’s 
Death Penalty” (2005).  Despite all of this, feminists 
have been relatively unwilling to tackle this subject. 
Rapaport (1991), whose analysis I will include 
later, says that this reluctance is due to a hesitance 
to campaign to kill more women.  I will return to 
these issues later, but start now with more on the 
background of gender and capital punishment itself. 
The aforementioned large racial disparity is but 
one reason to which Streib (2002) is referring in the 
introduction of his analysis, when he says that the “death 
penalty system” in America is one that “continues to 
carry the heavy burdens of intense political agendas” (p. 
1).  He argues quite rightly that the questions regarding 
capital punishment are not ones of justice, but “whether 
we can trust this hodgepodge of local, state, and federal 
government” methods to ensure procedural justice (p. 1). 
With regard to women, Streib says that jury selection 
processes do not ask questions about biases in favor 
of women, and research has indicated that juries are 
slanted toward female defendants (p. 1).  The death 
penalty arena itself is what Streib calls a “masculine 
sanctuary” because “typical macho posturing over the 
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death penalty is disrupted and confused 
when the murderer is a murderess” (p. 2). 
Capital crimes are, when viewed as norms, 
distinctly male norms, and Streib argues 
this is true of the behavior regardless 
of the sex of the perpetrator (p. 2).
In order to find patterns, Streib 
examined capital sentences from 1973 
forward, the significance of the date 
being that it was the first time when 
the information about them became 
normalized.  I gave earlier statistics on the 
rate of incidence, but it is interesting to look 
more closely at the 138 women sentenced 
to death from 1973 to 2001.  A paltry 5% 
(seven women) were actually executed, 
while 79 sentences were commuted or 
reversed, leaving only 52 on death row 
(Streib, 2002, p. 2).  Geographically, the 
sentences came from 23 states, with 
the largest numbers coming from North 
Carolina (16), Florida (15), California, 
(14), and, of course, Texas (13) (Streib, 
2002, p. 3). Harries and Cheatwood (1997) 
note that for those actually executed, the 
geographical distribution for males and 
females is basically the same (pp. 78-93). 
Streib describes the historical trajectory 
of two states, Virginia and Ohio, which 
executed many female offenders until 1912 
and 1954 respectively, but notes that as a 
whole, the pattern is unchanged and even 
in the Colonial period, female executions 
were less than 3% (2002, pp. 3, 6).
In detailing some of the executions 
that have taken place during the period, 
Streib notes in particular Karla Faye Tucker 
(Figure 1), the woman who is arguably 
the face associated with women and 
execution.  Streib writes that even though 
she had a history of violent behavior and 
her crime was aggressive and masculine, 
her status as an “attractive, photogenic, 
articulate white woman undoubtedly 
contributed to both the extensive media 
coverage and to the reluctance of the 
system to carry through to the end: (2002, 
p. 9).  Then Texas Governor George W. 
Bush had executed more than 130 people, 
but none of those subjected him to so 
much turmoil as the case of Tucker (2002, 
p. 9).  The rate of executions from 1990 to 
1997 had dropped to 0.5% but the Tucker 
case seemed to revitalize the punishment 
for women (2002, p. 9).  Tucker’s execution 
in 1998 was the first of a woman in Texas 
since 1863 and the first in the United States 
since 1984.  Tucker’s crime was a violation 
of society’s norms and expectations, due 
to her (born again) Christian persona, her 
physical beauty, and her femininity, but her 
execution was controversial and debated 
throughout the world.
More important than the statistics 
are what Streib identifies as institutional 
means of sex bias.  The first of those is the 
crimes selected for capital punishment. 
Domestic homicide, for example, is 
considered less serious and punishments 
are not as harsh (2002, p. 11).   One of 
the most common death row crimes 
is felony murder, meaning homicide 
performed during the commission of a 
felony such as rape, and women’s murders 
are less likely to be in such a category. 
Streib returns to domestic murder with 
infanticide as a further example of 
women’s position; women are rarely 
executed for killing their children (2002, 
p. 11).  In his studied time frame, only 
one of seven women sentenced to die for 
killing her children was actually executed; 
Streib is particularly uncomfortable with 
this idea, because “the broad negative 
impact of infanticide upon an entire 
community typically is more severe than 
for most other homicides” (2002, p. 11).
In addition to sentencing, Streib 
looks at how aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances impact women:
This final choice between the 
death sentence and life in prison 
focuses both upon the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and 
upon the character and background 
of the person who committed that 
crime. Regardless of the seriousness 
of the crime, it cannot automatically 
result in the death penalty. The 
personal characteristics of the 
convicted murderer also must 
be weighed in the balance. This 
is where the sex of the offender 
can come into play, probably 
unintentionally, but nonetheless 
with important consequences. As 
is explained below, this sex-specific 
impact may either favor or disfavor 
female capital defendants (STREIB, 
2002, pp. 11-12). 
One typical aggravating 
circumstance is murder for hire, 
and women more often hire killers; 
Gaile Owens is one example, and I 
will discuss her case in more depth 
later (Streib, 2002, p. 12).  
Another is a criminal record 
of violence, including violent 
felonies, and in this category 
women are less likely than men 
to have committed aggravating 
crimes.  Felony murder is a third 
usual aggravating circumstance, 
and it is more likely to affect men.  
Mitigating circumstances have the 
opposite effect of aggravating and 
are more likely to prevent a capital 
sentence.  They include emotional 
distress or domination by another, 
elements that judges and jurors are 
more likely to detect in the histories 
of women (Streib, 2002, p.13).  
The last method of institutional 
inequity is jury selection, especially 
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Figure 1: Karla Faye Tucker, executed 
2/3/98.
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important because juries are normally involved 
in sentencing in capital cases.   Though federal 
capital cases take sex bias into account, state 
processes are less likely to do so, giving yet 
another advantage to women (Streib, 2002, p. 14).
Feminism, the State, and Capital 
Punishment: Rapaport, Heberle, 
Brown, and Williams
Feminism is uncomfortable with the idea of capital 
punishment and, as I mentioned in the introduction, this 
is probably because, when viewing capital punishment 
as a negative consequence of behavior outside the norms 
of society, women are spared from this punishment as 
compared to men.  This fact is not justification for the 
lack of willingness on the part of feminists to address 
this subject.  Without advocating for a change in the 
rules or for the execution of more women, we should 
examine why the death penalty is structured to benefit 
women.  We should also determine if these practices 
are discriminatory in intent and whether or not the 
advantageous position of women can be replicated 
elsewhere without undue discrimination against men. 
Through a feminist lens, I am seeking to discover whether 
institutional framework exists to say something negative 
or positive about women, though anyone familiar with 
feminism could probably guess which result is most likely.
Elizabeth Rapaport addresses this issue when she 
admits that discovery of the roots of gender imbalance 
in capital punishment could be viewed as an attempt 
“to exterminate a few more wretched sisters” (1991, 
p. 368).  She takes issue with this, however, and says 
that the disparities in death penalty sentencing are 
more related to our differing societal standards of 
responsibility for men and women, meaning men are 
considered to be capable of being more responsible 
(1991, p. 368).  Rapaport uses similar statistics to 
Streib to show the characteristics of male and female 
murderers, including the types of crimes given capital 
punishment and mitigating and aggravating factors 
(1991, pp. 369-374).  She remarks almost happily that 
rather than “chivalrous regard for the female sex,” the 
disparities can be attributed to who the victims are and 
how background information is presented at trial (1991, 
p. 374).  Afterwards Rapaport sets out to discover how 
men and women arrive at death row.  One variable that 
she examines is “the pattern among murder suspects,” 
using North Carolina as her base (1991, p. 375).  Twelve 
percent of death row males in North Carolina had 
killed intimates, whereas 49 percent of females had 
(Rapaport, 1991, p. 375).  As a society, we appear to 
perceive women to be killing other criminals when 
their victims are abusive husbands or fellow inmates.
Lastly, Rapaport studies what she calls “gender 
interpretation of the conception of offense seriousness,” 
beginning with categories of murder (1991, p. 376). 
The three categories eligible for the death penalty 
include predatory murder, i.e., murder for some 
type of gain; murder that impedes law enforcement 
or other government; and murders of excessive 
violence.  Thus, categories singled out for capital 
punishment do not include the aforementioned 
intimate murder necessarily.  She says eloquently:
But the paradigmatic domestic killing, arising 
out of hot anger at someone who is capable, as 
it were by definition, of calling out painful and 
sudden emotion in his or her killer, is virtually 
the antithesis of capital murder (1991, p. 378).
She argues along Streib’s lines that some of these 
crimes are the most alarming and undermine the value 
of the home (1991, p. 378).  Her departure from Streib 
is when she inserts this into the feminist framework. 
Though she does not argue for the death penalty as 
a whole, she does enter the controversial territory of 
advocating harsher punishment for domestic crimes, 
i.e., female crimes.  Women are more likely to kill and 
be killed by intimates, and familial crimes such as 
these, especially when a child enters the picture, are 
the ones for which Rapaport argues changes in policy.
One suggestion is to raise severe and routine 
abuse of a husband, wife, or child to felony status in 
order to make those perpetrators eligible for felony 
murder (Rapaport, 1991, p. 379).  This suggestion only 
tangentially affects the sentencing of women, but the 
elevation of domestic non-capital crimes could move 
the capital punishment practices as well.  It is at this 
point that Rapaport addresses three anticipated feminist 
criticisms.  The first, that domestic violence is often 
“victim-precipitated” and that we should view victims as 
worthy of part of the blame, is discounted by Rapaport for 
being unable to account for the killing of a child (1991, 
p. 380).  The second is that the planning and calculating 
murderer is more worthy of scorn than the passionate 
killer, another distinction that does not adequately 
prioritize responses to spousal or child abuse (1991, 
p. 381).  Lastly, she says that the feminist viewpoint 
does not recognize the susceptibility of passion crimes 
to death penalty due to the deterrence argument 
(1991, p. 381).  Rapaport ends by reiterating that her 
primary goal is “to expose the ideological biases of 
the status quo in which domestic homicide is treated, 
invidiously, as almost always less reprehensible 
than predatory murder” (1991, p. 381).  She says, 
moreover, “we have no credible evidence that 
women are spared the death penalty in circumstances 
where it would be pronounced on men;” rather, it is “a 
J e n n a  B r a s h e a rG e n d e r  a n d  c a P i t a l  P u n i s h m e n t :  t h e  c a s e  o f  G a i l e  o We n s
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  K E N T U C K Y  J O U R N A L  O F  U N D E R G R A D U AT E  S C H O L A R S H I P   7
question of social ideology” (1991, p. 382).
Renee Heberle agrees that it is social 
ideology, and she writes that it is society 
that “wonders whether women, as women, 
need to be rendered more commonly 
subject to the disciplinary sanctions of the 
state, not in the name of equality but in the 
name of managing the disorder engendered 
by unequal relations of power” (Heberle, 
1999, p. 1104).  She suggests that the 
focus should not be on the statistics but 
instead on gender expectations and norms 
(1999, p. 1104).  The question she poses 
is whether or not, as others have asked, 
femininity and the traits we associate with 
such an abstract concept are themselves 
enough to protect women from harsh 
criminal punishment.
Herberle departs from Rapaport at the 
point of deciding where the significance 
lies in the gendering of intimate murder, 
arguing that the imbalance is instead 
between civil and domestic spheres, 
causing asymmetry with respect to the 
sexes.  As an example, she says that men 
acting violently in the home are only 
acting according to societal expectations, 
whereas women behaving similarly have 
to be punished or “re-feminized” (1999, 
p. 1105).  Thus, contrary to Rapaport, 
Heberle believes death row is home not 
to the most deserving and despicable 
criminals, but rather a population that is 
reconstructing social hierarchies.  Most 
importantly, Heberle believes that women 
are the ones exempt from death row 
because they “have a kind of escape route 
in appropriately feminine behavior” (199, 
p. 1108).   Karla Faye Tucker is mentioned 
again, this time as an example of someone 
outside feminine norms. Even though she 
was converted by religion, she could not 
overcome her former comment that she 
had orgasms when she hit her victims. 
This, Heberle observes, is a dramatic action 
that inverted expectations of gender.   
Heberle believes that the dichotomies 
she explored were examples of the liberal 
state; Wendy Brown is one feminist who 
has explored theories of the state and 
norms that the resultant institutions 
have constructed.  There are four specific 
models that she analyzes: liberal, capitalist, 
prerogative, and bureaucratic.  She argues 
that the state is a male power in subtle and 
overt ways.  For the sake of brevity, I will 
limit this discussion to the liberal modality, 
in which I believe capital punishment 
and its strange relationship with women 
fall.  Liberal thinking divides society into 
domestic, economic, and governmental 
sections.  Women fall into the domestic 
sphere and, once there, can scarcely 
escape.
The private domain of the home is 
neither private nor safe for women (Brown, 
1992, p. 18).  Brown posits that rights 
do not really exist there, but instead the 
area is “governed by norms of duty, love, 
and custom, and until quite recently, has 
been largely shielded from the reach of 
law” (1992, p. 18).  This is, in theory, the 
gap of which Rapaport speaks, the realm 
that contains both individual and privacy 
rights, a juxtaposition that the state has 
difficulty reconciling.  For women, the 
group disproportionately affected by 
domestic crimes, this liberal posturing is 
problematic.
Another general feminist approach 
that could be applied is that of Wendy 
Williams, who critiques women’s positions 
with regard to the courts.  In an era when 
women are guaranteed equal rights, the 
equality is equal to men, so the rights 
afforded to women by the government are 
at best male rights (1997, p. 71).  Williams 
looks at equality issues such as the military 
draft, and writes on the inherent troubles 
with associating men with war and sex 
and women with whatever is opposite, 
namely as “[mothers] of humanity” 
(1997, p. 78).  Much of Williams’ article 
is a debate between special rights and 
equality treatment, and she sides with 
equality treatment.  The true issue is 
characterizations of males and females, 
and she argues that gender roles should 
be complementary in light of all of these 
problems, rather than explicitly equal 
(1997, p. 84).  With these arguments and 
perspectives in mind, it is time to look at 
how the law affected one woman.
Owens v. Guida Background
Of the eleven women currently on death 
row, six killed a boyfriend, significant 
other, or husband, a statistic worthy of its 
own research (DPIC Women, 2009).  For 
the time being, however, we will focus 
on one of those women.  Gaile K. Owens 
(Figure 2) was sentenced to death in 
Tennessee after hiring Sidney Porterfield 
to kill her husband.  All of the following 
information and quotes are taken from 
the text of the appellate decision; the case 
was heard in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which includes 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan. 
I chose Gaile Owens’ case because of her 
interesting story, its relative obscurity, 
especially compared to the case of Karla 
Faye Tucker, and for its illustration of the 
arguments noted above.  Owens’ case 
shows many of the unique situations that 
lead women to death row, and thus helps 
to answer the question, “What does it take 
for a woman to be sentenced to death?”
In 1985, Owens interviewed several 
hit men with the purpose of hiring one to 
kill Ronald Owens.  Trial evidence showed 
that she met with the eventual hit man, 
Sidney Porterfield, on a minimum of three 
occasions.  On February 17, 1985, Ronald 
Owens was found in the Owens’ den with 
his skill crushed from what the coroner 
determined was a minimum of 21 blows 
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Figure 2: A recent mugshot of Gaile Owens, 
whose lawyers were still in the appeals 
process in February 2010, attempting to 
have her sentence commuted from the 
death penalty to life imprisonment.
of a tire iron.  The beating was so forceful that bone 
chips from his skull had been lodged in his brain “and 
his face had been driven into the floor.”  There was 
blood on the walls and floor, and the condition of his 
hands, according to pathology, suggested he had been 
trying to shield his face from the blows of the tire iron.
Upon the discovery of Owens’ body and the public 
revelation of the crime, one of the other men solicited 
by Gaile Owens, George James, went to the police out 
of anxiety that he might be suspected in the murder. 
He agreed to meet with Owens and wear a wire.  In 
this meeting, she “explained that she had her husband 
killed because of ‘bad marital problems’ and paid James 
$60 to keep quiet.”  Owens and Porterfield eventually 
confessed to their respective crimes, and Porterfield 
stated that Owens volunteered $17,000 for the job.  He 
also gave more details on how he beat Mr. Owens to 
death, from an initial confrontation in the backyard 
that continued into the house.  Gaile Owens said that 
“that she had Ronald killed because ‘we’ve just had a 
bad marriage over the years, and I just felt like he had 
been cruel to me.  There was little physical violence.’”
The jury found Owens guilty of murder and murder-
for-hire and “a murder that was ‘especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel.’”  She and Porterfield were both 
sentenced to death.  They appealed to the Tennessee 
Supreme Court and lost, and then continued appeals 
through various channels.  The following majority and 
dissenting opinions illuminate the factors that Streib 
and Rapaport elucidated, including mitigating and 
aggravating factors.  The technical functions of these 
judicial particularities often serve to shield women 
from capital punishment.  In the case of Owens, 
however, she and/or her counsel did almost everything 
wrong if their aim was to avoid the death penalty.
Majority Opinion
On the first claim, that her attorneys had not properly 
investigated or presented mitigating evidence, the court 
ruled that the performance of Owens’ attorneys was not 
deficient.  One of the bases of their argument was that 
her unwillingness to cooperate had complicated the 
mitigation process, because she would not testify or allow 
family or mental health examiners to do so.  “A defendant 
cannot be permitted to manufacture a winning IAC 
[inadequate assistance of counsel] claim by sabotaging 
her own defense, or else every defendant clever enough 
to thwart her own attorneys would be able to overturn 
her sentence on appeal.”  The court supported this ruling 
with evidence from the same circuit, using male clients.
The court wrote that the whole of her COA (Court 
of Appeals) claim was in essence a claim that she should 
have had battered-wife defense.  This was refuted by 
the fact that her attorneys had considered both that 
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defense and an insanity plea.  The implausibility of 
an insanity plea was refuted by the testimony of two 
jail employees, who testified “that she was a model 
prisoner.” Another inefficiency component of Owens’s 
appeal was regarding the inability of her defense to 
surmount the prosecution’s hearsay objection to Dr. 
Max West’s testimony.  Though West had spent an 
hour with Owens, he was not allowed to testify about 
her family history.  During sentencing, Dr. Max West, 
a psychiatrist testified for Owens, saying that he, a 
psychiatrist, had seen her in 1978 for behavioral issues. 
In the end, West’s only basic testimony was that 
Owens had “some kind of severe problem.”  The appellate 
court found that a statute existed that could have allowed 
this testimony, but it was not cited by the counsel, and 
because this “decision was a legitimate strategic” one, the 
appellate court ruled it was not harmful to Owens.  Owens 
argument was that, had West been allowed to testify:
He would have said that Owens told him 
that: 1) her parents were too hard on her; 2) 
she was forced to care for a mentally retarded 
brother; 3) her parents habitually lied to each 
other and to the children; 4) she never felt like 
she was needed; and 5) she had a ‘fairly severe 
characterological [sic] or personality disorder.’
Her counsel argued that they were afraid that 
West would have testified to, among other things, the 
reason why she had seen him, which was that she 
embezzled money.  Lastly, the court determined that 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) was not violated 
in refusing to turn over cards and love notes between 
Ronald Owens and his lover Gala Scott.  Brady found that 
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable 
to an accused who has requested it violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution.” (pp. 86-88)  However, the appeals court 
decision argued that Mrs. Owens could have introduced 
other evidence about the affair, an example being that 
she could have subpoenaed Scott.  All of these issues are 
ones of mitigation and illustrate the need for Owens to 
establish a motive and illustrate the types of problems she 
had faced that would have led her to kill her husband.
 
Also at issue was Owens’s willingness to accept the 
initial plea deal of life imprisonment.  The condition was 
that she and Porterfield must both accept, and she wanted 
her prior cooperation to be presented in court.  The 
appellate court upheld the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 
determination that a prior decision, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586 (1978), made her plea-bargaining irrelevant to 
her sentencing.  In reference to Lockett, the court stated 
“no court, let alone the Supreme Court, has held that 
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failed plea negotiations may be admitted at 
a penalty-phase hearing.”  On the subject, 
the court wrote further that Owens’s “best 
argument is that the evidence is relevant to 
the positive character trait of ‘acceptance 
of responsibility.’”  Even here, she is 
deemed a failure by the court because she 
did not offer an unconditional guilty plea 
in its place.  They wrote, “Thus, she was 
less interested in accepting responsibility 
and more interested in avoiding the 
electric chair, a motivation that is much 
less persuasive as a mitigating factor.” 
The court determined that it was not a 
violation of federal law to prohibit the 
introduction of her willingness to accept 
the plea bargain.
In summation, the court wrote:
First, the entire premise of the 
dissent’s rhetoric is that counsel 
were obviously incompetent for 
not relying on what is called, in 
parts of both my state and that of 
the dissenter, the ‘he just needed 
killing’ defense.  While it could be 
true that a counsel of the dissenter’s 
skill could have sold a jury on that 
defense, there are many reasons 
that counsel making such a choice 
is the essence of a ‘strategic’ choice.
Here, the court asserted that 
she calculatedly interviewed hit men 
possibilities, and gave Porterfield the 
necessary information that enabled 
him to violently kill Ronald Owens. 
Thus, the majority (Chief Justice 
Boggs and Justice Siler) affirmed 
the decision of the district court to 
deny Owens’s habeas corpus petition.
Dissent
Of the three-judge panel, Judge Merritt 
dissented, writing that “the majority 
opinion slants and misconceives relevant 
facts and law in this case on the three 
major issues in order to uphold the death 
penalty.”  He wrote that his dissent “[tries] 
to straighten out the case for the reader 
by introducing the actual facts and the 
correct legal principles to be applied.”
The facts about [Ronald] 
Owens’s cruel and sadistic behavior 
toward his wife now make an 
overwhelming case of domestic 
violence and psychological abuse 
in mitigation of the murder case 
against Gaile Owens.  From the 
beginning, Mrs. Owens’ counsel 
knew that this was her best—
indeed, her only—defense.  Before 
trial, her counsel told the trial 
court that in his opinion: “This 
case has a meritorious defense in 
the battered-wife syndrome.”… 
The Memphis district attorneys 
obviously knew that this was the 
defense theory.  But this defense 
was never developed or even 
mentioned to the jury during 
the trial because of the cover-up 
of exculpatory evidence by the 
Memphis prosecutor and the 
complete failure of defense counsel 
to conduct a proper investigation of 
[Ronald] Owens’ sadistic behavior 
toward his wife.
Judge Merritt wrote that Mrs. Owens 
asked prior to trial for the prosecutor 
to give her attorneys everything he had 
that illustrated the fact of her husband’s 
adulterous activities, including evidence 
of his many mistresses and the affairs that 
entailed sexual details such as fetishes 
or perversions.  Merritt’s opinion argues 
that the routine and continual flaunting 
of these acts to Mrs. Owens was enough 
to contribute to her mindset.  There were 
two specific, sexually graphic letters 
between Mr. Owens and Gayla Scott that 
were repressed, with nicknames alluding 
to oral sexual encounters.  Merritt takes the 
most offense to the prosecution’s “lying to 
the trial court” by saying they had given 
all of their evidence.  They went so far as 
to specify that they had given “any piece 
of paper, any notebook—anything along 
those lines, letters, and etc. that we have.” 
Merritt accuses the majority of using 
the logic that Mrs. Owens could have 
presented this information herself, despite 
the fact that a murder defendant is 
naturally lacking in credibility and also 
that the ruling of the majority is contrary 
to Brady v. Maryland.  “It is certainly true 
that the blatant prosecutorial misconduct 
suppressing the love letters was 
highly material and prejudicial at the 
mitigation phase of the trial,” he wrote.
Regarding ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Merritt argues that the majority’s 
opinion was biased toward the State 
“both as to the facts and the law.” 
Merritt’s basic argument is that the 
defense counsel failed in researching 
and developing a defense.  Not only did 
it strip the defense of a better argument 
to abandon the battered-wife strategy, it 
severely weakened Owens’s motive.  If it 
were not a battered-wife or self defense 
argument, the only remaining motive put 
forth for her crime was “insurance money.”
Merritt argues that the decision fails 
to comply with the Sixth Amendment and 
the American Bar Association Guidelines 
for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 
Under those requirements, “counsel 
must fully investigate all mitigating 
circumstances, even when the defendant 
does not want to take the stand or is not 
forthcoming.”  He accused the majority’s 
use of the Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 
1933, 1939 case as inadequate because 
“[Owens] did not even refuse to cooperate, 
much less instruct counsel not to put 
on mitigating evidence.”  Also, while 
the majority attributed counsel’s measly 
hours of investigation in preparation for 
mitigation to under-billing, Merritt argues 
that “counsel abandoned the investigation 
of the defense,” because the attorney “had 
no incentive to falsify his investigation.” 
Merritt goes so far as to present 
the evidence that the “counsel would 
have found” had they proper ly 
investigated the background.  This 
section is worth quoting in its entirety:
Ron Owens was abusive 
toward Ms. Owens.  He subjected 
her to physical, emotional, and 
sexual abuse beginning with 
their wedding night when he was 
forceful and impatient, demanding 
sex immediately upon entering 
their hotel room.  When Ms. Owens 
revealed to her new husband that 
she was in great pain and bleeding 
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profusely, he called her frigid, and angrily left 
the hotel room stating that “If you won’t, I know 
where I can find someone who will.”
There are many further horrors.  Mr. Owens 
inserted and broke a wine bottle inside Mrs. Owen’s 
vagina, and also penetrated her with a “penis-
shaped marijuana pipe…which caused her pain 
and humiliation.”   Moreover, Mr. Owens forced his 
wife to have sex the night before she gave birth, and 
the “brutal sexual intercourse” caused the placenta 
to “partially [detach].”  An emergency C-section 
was required for the safety of mother and child.
Mrs. Owens endured verbal and emotional abuse 
as well.  When their children were born, “Mr. Owens 
accused Ms. Owens of not taking properly her birth 
control pills and complained that the children would 
be an unbearable financial burden.”  He berated her 
with comments such as, “she did not sweat much for 
a fat person.”  He was not only physically unfaithful, 
but “also deceitful;” he lied to his wife as well as other 
people about volunteering for service in Vietnam, 
as well as being shot there [twice] and contracting 
Malaria.  He also falsified his educational background, 
claiming to have a Bachelor’s degree.  All of these factors 
led, Merritt writes, to the sentence Owens received.
Gaile Owens and Feminist Theory
Before delving too deeply into the intricacies of this case, 
it is interesting but probably not surprising to note that it 
falls along political lines.  The two judges in the majority 
were appointed by conservative Presidents; Boggs was 
appointed by Ronald Reagan and Siler by George H.W. 
Bush.  Justice Merritt, however, was nominated by 
Carter, and it cannot be coincidence that they wrote 
opinions that fit neatly with those conflicting ideologies.
As noted above, Gaile Owens managed to fit her 
crime into the narrow guidelines that actually execute 
women.  She was immediately disadvantaged by the 
aggravating circumstance of murder-for-hire.  What she 
was forced to argue after her conviction and sentencing, 
then, was that mitigating factors should have been 
enough to save her, and that her counsel had not 
researched or presented that information in an effective 
way.  Thus, her case is really comprised of a push 
and pull between mitigating and aggravating factors.
Though it would be too generous to argue that 
Owens was unworthy of punishment, the majority’s 
simple characterization of every claim against her 
counsel as their choice of  “strategy” seems a dubious 
path to choose when a human life is what hangs in the 
figurative balance of justice.  At what point can courts 
agree that it is possible for bad strategy to be ineffective 
counsel?  Rapaport’s vehemence that domestic crimes 
be elevated somewhat ignores the frequent and severe 
domestic abuse that often leads women to retaliate 
and seek revenge against their husbands.  The 
majority opinion does not give credence to Owens’s 
claims of such violence, but I would argue that if even 
half of her claims were true, it would warrant the 
reduction from a death sentence to life without parole.
Moreover, my own personal argument is that 
Mrs. Owens was punished because she simply does 
not fit the female murderer stereotype, similar to 
arguments by Heberle.  She is outside conceptions 
of traditional femininity, and instead fits the mold of 
the aggressive murderer.  The norm is a male killer, 
but Owens’s unwillingness to cooperate is too stark 
a contrast with the societal expectations of a female 
killer, if they even exist — a weeping, terrified, and 
apologetic female who loved her husband despite 
the frequent beatings he gave her, and who shot 
him to keep him from shooting her or their children.
The majority opinion places blame on Mrs. Owens 
for taking control of her defense, something a woman 
would not usually be expected to do, and also says 
that she impeded her defense.  While this might be 
true, much of Owens’s problem seems to be that she, 
like many other subjects of feminist theory, did not 
know the proper course of action with respect to the 
law.  Her initial statement that a bad marriage was her 
motive was soon supplemented with the instances in 
which she suffered intense verbal and sexual abuse.
In a broad sense, this case is not only an implication 
of two individuals whose relationship had gone sour, but 
also the culture that allowed a situation to escalate to 
the point of violence and murder.  For Mrs. Owens, she 
felt trapped by an empty marriage, but felt that the only 
means of escape was to kill her husband.  Is it because 
the Owens lived in rural Tennessee that she felt divorce 
was not an acceptable decision?  Would her husband 
have allowed it?  Did she have a means of income if she 
were to be granted a divorce?  What sort of person kills 
her husband because of a bad marriage?  The majority 
decided that such a person is one worthy of execution, 
but I would argue that there could have been a more 
gender-equal culture that provided options for Gaile 
Owens before she was compelled to hire a hit man.
Conclusion
Victor Streib alluded to the fact that today, in the 
current tangled climate of courts and endless appeals 
and overworked attorneys, capital punishment is a 
questionable practice at best.  It is likely that many of 
the people interested in the relationship between women 
and the death penalty, such as myself, are critical of the 
death penalty in general, and thus would avoid calls for 
equality that might lead to more executions.  This fact 
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Photo Sources
has probably kept a considerable number 
of feminist writers away from the subject 
in favor of topics on which they can 
speak to inspire positive social change, 
for example the difference in prosecution 
of crack versus white powder cocaine.
Nonetheless, women on death row 
provide, as I hope I have shown, another 
thread of inequality.  Though many women 
are protected through this inequality, the 
assumptions that put it in place—the 
devaluing of domestic crime, for example—
are not necessarily results of positive views 
of women.  A long-ago acquaintance of my 
stepmother killed her husband after years 
of abuse and received only 18 months in 
prison.  It is hard, even for feminists, to 
reverse this situation in their minds.  It is 
still a persistent belief that a woman cannot 
abuse her husband, at least physically, and 
if he committed murder in self-defense, 
he would be laughed out of court, as well 
as much more likely to receive a capital 
sentence.  It is my hope that capital 
punishment and gender will come more 
into the mainstream in the future as a key 
example of the difficulty in establishing 
and defining rights and also the struggle 
to develop a system of rules or a singular 
theory that will explain everything.  If one 
such theory existed, more feminists would 
be writing about capital punishment.
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